to question:among other things, that something be open to the possibility of denial

Yang: everything is open to the possibility of denial (at least, for him)

Jim: some things are open to the possibility of denial and some things are not

Spinoza: (let's call this person by this name) nothing is open to the possibility of denial.

contingent: open to the possibility of denial.

necessary: not open to the possibility of denial.

From that it follows:

Yang: all things are contingent

Jim: some things are necessary and some things are contingent.

Spinoza: all things are necessary

When one can question, it is possible for its opposite to be.

Question: Is this possible for all beings?

The answer must be no or else there can be no contingent beings.

How so?

Another aspect of a contingent/questionable being is that such a being has a reason sufficient to explain why they are not their opposite.

If it were not the case, then there would be no difference between a contingent being and its opposite and there would be no true opposites.

For example:

contingent being= x

contingent opposite= ~x

x has nothing to make it distinct from ~x

x=~x

These are not truly opposites (because at least for something to be an opposite they must be different).

So x must have a reason sufficient to explain it such that it is different than its opposite.

If all beings, then, were contingent/questionable, then they must have reasons sufficient to explain them.

But, if all beings were contingent, there could be no contingent beings because there would never be a reason sufficient to explain them.

How?

Each reason sufficient to explain a contingent being would itself be contingent (because all things are open to the possibility of denial).

If this were to happen infinitely, then no reason would be established such that a difference between a contingent being and its opposite could be established.

Since there would be no reason, there would be no true opposites, and nothing would be contingent.

Therefore , there must be at least one necessary being sufficient to explain all contingent beings if there are beings at all.

Yang, then, it is impossible for everything to be open to the possibility of denial. This cosmological argument shows that to be the case without any more room for questioning (except whether things exist at all--and that's where the ontological argument steps in).

I have to go for the moment, but that's the reasoning behind why I am not only sure but assured.

Jim Macdonald